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Rose: Guaranty--Promise of Banker "To Insure" Deposit
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
seems to support the principal case.10
Some states, including West Virginia, have enlarged the privilege by statute. An early Virginia law privileged the members
"from all arrests, attachments, executions and all other process
whatsoever". By this law it was possible to issue civil process,

but it could not be served until the end of the privilege.17 West
Virginia, with a constitutional privilege similar to that in the federal constitution, 5 has a statute which allows the service of civil
process but declares that, "no trial shall be had or judgment rendered in any such suit, nor shall any execution or attachment be
levied upon the property of such member during the sessions of
the legislature or for ten days immediately before or immediately
after session.'"" If any such action is taken it will be held invalid and set aside.20 If we accept the interpretation of the principal case it would seem that the statute is broader than the constitutional base on which it rests. Yet a similar provision has been
declared valid.2
-RALPH IM.

GUARANTY -

PROMISE OF BANKER "To INSURE"

WHITE.

DEPOSIT -

STATUTE OF FRAUDS. - Plaintiff went to the Bank of F, fearing it
was insolvent, and intending to withdraw her deposit. Defendant,
a director, stockholder, and depositor in the Bank of F, who was
a man of means, known to plaintiff a long time, said to plaintiff,
"I will insure your money. It is safe here."
The bank subsequently failed, and plaintiff sued defendant on his promise. Held,
defendant's promise was original, upon sufficient consideration,
10 Howard v. Citizens Bank and Trnst Co.. 12 ApT). D. C. 222 (1898) ; Merrick v. Giddings, .mipra n. 15; Kimberly v. Butler. 14 Ped. Cas. 499 (1869);
Dovle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. Mnn.. 151 Ark. 629, 2.18 S. IV. 40 (1922);
Phillips v. Browne, 270 fll. 450. 110 N. F. 601 (1915); Berlet v. Wcary, 67
Neb. 75, 93 N. W. 238 (1903 ; Wo-th v. Norton, 56 S. C. 56, 33 S. E. 792,
45 L. R. A. 563 (1898); Bartlett v. Blair, 68 N. H. 232, 38 Atl. 1004 (1894);
Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn. 542. 57 N. W. 212, 23 L. R. A. 632 (1893); Gentry v. Griffiths, 27 Tex. 461 (1864); Johnson v. Offutt, .mpra n. 6; Catlett v.
Morton, 4 Litt. 122 (Ky. 1823); see Wilder v. Welsh, 1 MacArthur 566 (D.
C. 1874).
17 McPherson v. Nesmith, 3 Gratt. 237 (Va. 1846).
18W. VA. CONST., art. V , § 17.
19 W. VA. REV. CoDn (1931) c. 4. art. 1, § 3.
20 Pittinger and Pugh, Ex'rs v. Marshll, 50 W. Va. 229, 40 S. E. 342
(1901).
21 See Phillips v. Browne, supra n. 16; noted in (1916) 16 COL. L. REV.
249. (The statute was held uncorsfitutional, however. ,s violating a provision against local or special legislation). What of the "guaranty" of speedy
justice in all cases? W. VA. CONST., art. M-I,§ 17.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1935

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1935], Art. 11
RECENt CASE COMMENTS
and thus a guaranty not within the statute of frauds. Garren v.
Youngblood.'
Ordinarily, once the consideration for a promise has been established, it is irrelevant in the further interpretation of the contract, and the scope of the promisor's obligation is measured by
its express language and intent. However, in the case of a promise
to pay the debt of another, which is within the statute of frauds,2
the character of the consideration is used to stamp the promise as
original or collateral.
There is authority for the proposition that surrender to the
new promisor of property which was held by the creditor as security for his claim takes the promise out of the statute.4
These
cases have furnished the foundation for an inroad upon the statute
in the United States. Deserting the first test the courts devised
for determination of a collateral promise, "Did the original debtor still remain liable on his promise?'' in 1811 Chancellor Kent,
of New York, dangerously lessened the scope of the statute by holding that it did not bar a promise where there was a new consideration of benefit or harm moving between the newly contracting
parties.8 This rule would make binding almost any promise based
upon valid consideration, 7 and is obviously too broad. Hence it
has been discredited and abandoned, 8 even by New York,' in favor
of the more limited extension made by Massachusetts and the
1176 S. E. 252 (N. C. 1934).
2 N. C. CoDE AN. (Michie, 1927) § 987:
"'No action shall be brought .
to charge any defendant upon a special promise to answer the debt, default,
or miscarriage of another person, unless . . . . some memorandum or note
thereof be in writing." This provision is common to most of the state statutes
of frauds.
- Note (1920) 8 A. L. R. 1199.
4 Cassels v. Alabu-a City, G. & A. Ry. Co., 198 Ala. 250, 73 So. 494 (1916);
West-moreland v. Porter, 75 Ala. 452 (1883); Manning v. Anthony, 208 Mass.
399, 94 N. E. 466 (1911); Williams v. Leper, 3 Burr. 1886, 97 Eng. Rep. 1152
(1766).
5 White v. Rintoul, 108 N. Y. 222.225, 15 N. E. 318 (1888).
This test, the
easiest and most obvious, though discarded, is still mentioned in West Vir4
g nip: M anld' v. Jones, 63 W. Va. 373, 60 S. E. 248 (1907); Johnson v. Bank,
60 W. Va. 320, 55 S. E. 394 (1906).
6Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. 29, 5 Am. Dec. 317 (N. Y. 1811).
7 Maule v. Buemell, 50 Pa. St. 39 (1865) ; Williston on Contracts, (2d ed.
1920) § 472.
8 Hurst Hardware Co. v. Goodman, 68 W. Va. 462, 69 S. E. 898 (1910);
Mankin v. Jones, s'tpra n. 5: Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Stockgrowers'
Bank. 173 Fed. 859 (1900); White v. Rintoul, supra n. 5. However, vestiges
of Kent's rule remain in a few states: Brinkley Car Works & Mfg. Co. v.
Smith, 110 Ark. 325, 161 S. W. 1065 (1913); Marrow v. White, 151 N. C. 96,
65 S. E. 746 (1909); Ellis v. Carroll, 68 S. C. 376, 41 S. E. 679 (1904).
9 White v. Rintoul, supra n. 5; Brown v. Weber, 38 X. Y. (11 Tiff.) 187
(1868).
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United States Supreme Court, viz., an oral promise to pay the debt
of another may be enforced, if given for any consideration which
is beneficial to the promisor, and desired by him to promote some
interest of his own. 10 While the American Law Institute accepts
this proposition,"' the English courts still reject such a conserva2
tive view.'
On facts similar to those of the instant case, Missouri has held
that the promise of the director is collateral, since the debt of the
bank still exists, the main object being forbearance in behalf of
the bank, and any benefit to the promisor is merely incidental."
Alabama has held that such a promise by the cashier, in writing,
is collateral, and not original.' 4 In a West Virginia decision the
promise of the president of a business corporation was treated as
14
collateral. a
In the instant case, the court purports to base its decision on
the doctrine that receipt by the new promisor of a beneficial consideration removes the promise from the statute, which proposition, Williston states, cannot be accepted as a matter of theory.15
Certainly a subjective test is applied to the promise, involving the
motive of the promisor,' which is contrary to the general contracts rule. It is submitted that this results, in the instant case,
in grave distortion of the ordinary meaning of the word "insurer".
A further quaere is, does the "beneficial consideration" involved
here create sufficient evidence of a promise to satisfy the policy of
the statute in regard to the prevention of perjury?
Furthermore, it is generally held that the mere interest of a
10 Emerson v. Slater. 22 How. 28, 16 L. Ed. .60 (1859): Alger v. Scoville,
67 Mass. (1 Gray) 391, 396 (1854); Curtis v. Brown, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 488

(1850).

11 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 184: "Where the consideration for a promise that all or part of a previously existing duty of a
third person to the promisee shall be satisfied is in fact or apparently desired
mainly for his own pecuniary or business advantage, rather than in order
to benefit the third person, the promise is not within Class 1 of § 178 (Contracts with Vtn obligee to answer to him for the debt, default, or miscarriage
of his obligor) unless the consideration is merely a premium for the promisor's
insurance that the duty shall be discharged."
"2Davys v. Bnswell [191.11 2 K. B. 47; l1arburg India Rubber Comb Co.
v. Martin [19021 1 K. B. 778.
13 Walther v. Merrell, 6 Mo. App. 370 (1878).
14 Edwards v. Bryan, 214 Ala. 441, 108 So. 9 (1926).
14a Hurst Hardware Co. v. Goodman, supra n. 8.
1" WMILISTON ON CONTRACTS § 472.
26 Garren v. Youngblood, srupra n. 1, at 254:

"The real character of a

promise does not depend altogether upon form of expression, but largely upon
the situation of the parties. and unon whether they nndprqtood it to be a
collateral or direct promise." Cf., Dillard v, Walker, 204 X. C. 16, 167 S. E.
636 (1933).
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stockholder and officer in a corporation is incidental only, and not
a sufficiently independent benefit to the promisor to take the case
out of the statute.1" Thus, if we cannot establish a benefit to the
defendant here as a depositor, the result must be explained by
Chancellor Kent's erroneous doctrine of "new consideration of
benefit or harm", based on plaintiff's forbearance to withdraw her
deposit.
As a result, however, the instant holding may be desirable, in
the light of current legal tendencies adding to the responsibilities
Since rather vague words are sometimes conof bank officials.
strued by the courts to be promises, the instant holding might be
deemed to impose too heavy a burden on bank officials asked about
the condition of a bank, but do not both honesty and fairness to
depositors require that their answers be accurate and discreet?
-HERSCBEL H. ROSE, JR.

INSURANCE -

LIABILITY INSURANCE

-

EXCEPTED RISKS

-

EF

A collision policy
FECT oF ABSENCE OF CAUSATIVE CONNECTION. to the insured's
or
damage
loss
against
provided for insurance
automobile occasioned by accidental means. There was a provision
that it should not apply "when the automobile was being used or
maintained by any person in violation of the law as to age or by
any person under the age of sixteen years." The car was damaged
Twelve
while being driven by the insured's son, aged fifteen.
years was then the legal age for drivers in South Carolina. No
causal connection between the age of the driver and the accident
was shown. Plaintiff brought suit and defendant's demurrer was
overruled and defendant appealed. Held, in order for the company to be relieved from liability, there must be some causative
connection between the accident and the fact that the car was beMcGee v. Globe Indemnity
ing driven by a minor. Affirmed.

Company.'
Since an insurer normally has the right to select the particular risks to be assumed, certain exceptions are usually set forth
2
in the policy. The exception operates to exclude a specified risk
17 Hurst Hardware Co. v. Goodman, supra n. 8; Edwards v. Bryan, supra
n. 14; Walther v. Merell, supro n. 13.

1175 S. E. 849 (S. C. 1934).
2 Boston v. American Mutual Accident Association, 92 Wis. 83, 65 X. W.

861 (1896).

VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 822.
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